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28 February 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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28 February 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*USSR: Khrushchev's 27 February 'election speech' was an apparent effort to convey an impression of a general hardening in the Soviet attitude toward the West.

Khrushchev's unyielding position probably was partly intended to strengthen Moscow's bargaining position before bilateral talks are resumed with the US on the Berlin and German problems. Khrushchev may also have been seeking to offset any impression that his decision to withdraw "several thousand" Soviet troops from Cuba marks a reduction of Soviet support for the Castro regime.

The speech suggests that Khrushchev intends to temporize on such issues as a nuclear test ban and Berlin while attempting to exploit differences within the Western alliance to weaken the US negotiating position. He restated his uncompromising position on a maximum of two or three on-site inspections and said "one cannot expect more from us." Khrushchev's perfunctory reiteration of his Berlin proposals contained no hint that he expects early progress toward a settlement.

Although Khrushchev avoided direct criticism of President Kennedy, he charged that "madmen" are pushing the US Government toward an invasion of Cuba. He warned that such an attack would be "incompatible" with President Kennedy's "pledges," which he again tried to represent as a formal US non-invasion commitment. Khrushchev's threat that the USSR would assist Cuba or any other "socialist country" in case of attack did not go beyond previous warnings. As in the past, he avoided any

specific commitment to launch a retaliatory blow against the US.

In addition to stressing the deterrent power of Soviet economic and military strength, Khrushchev attempted to minimize the adverse effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on Moscow's world position. He expressed confidence that the "fraternal parties" will be able to overcome "differences and disputes which arise among them."

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DAILY BRIEF

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DAILY BRIEF

Greece-Turkey: Relations between Greece and Turkey are steadily deteriorating.

A controversy over local government on Cyprus, Turkey's intention to extend its territorial waters, and alleged increased Turkish pressure on the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul have led to fiery comments in the Greek press and to sharp diplomatic exchanges.

If the trend continues, cooperation between the two countries in NATO matters may again be jeopardized.

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DAILY BRIEF

*Yemen-UK: British and Aden Federation forces on 26 February used artillery to dislodge Yemeni troops from a watering place in the undefined border area. Yemeni President Sallal has protested to the United Nations, and UAR and Yemeni propaganda media are accusing the British of "imperialist aggression." Further incidents are likely as the Yemenis continue their efforts to retake the nearby royalist-held town of Harib.

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Editor's Note: The last sentence of the Cuba brief (page 2 of the 27 February Central Intelligence

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Bulletin) should be deleted. There are press reports stating that the distribution of certain ransom drugs began on 21 February.

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DAILY BRIEF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 27 February 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 93-63: "The Character of the Goulart Regime in Brazil"

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DAILY BRIEF

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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